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BOOK REVIEWS
THE FAMILY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME EMERGING PROBLEMS.

Edited by R. Lillich. Charlottesville: Michie, 1981. Pp. xii, 164.
Reviewed by Stephen C. Hicks*
The articles in this book comprise the Proceedings of the Third
Sokol Colloquium held at the University of Virginia in April 1979
to commemorate the International Year of the Child. The book is
a handsome library edition of 150 pages with four chapters and a
full index. Each of the chapters is written by a separate contributor and two of the articles already have appeared in print. The
Proceedings have been published in book form to reach a wider
audience, especially overseas. Four articles, however, do not make
a book. Three of the articles concern children's rights and two of
these present different perspectives on the Draft Convention on
the Rights of the Child. The authors' different opinions about parental control and the best interest of the child remain independent. Neither of these two articles refers to the other. The third
article describes the resolution of issues of the child's best interest by the United States courts in one class of cases. The first
article in the book stands on its own, focusing on the validity of
marriage. As a record of the Proceedings of the Sokol Colloquium,
the book lacks the vitality of the event. It lacks the Proceedings'
continuity and self-reflection through questions and comments. It
is a pity that an introduction, an overview, or even a concluding
essay was not added. Even so, the two longest articles successfully
combine a good overview of current international efforts to protect children with a thorough discussion of the problems of current domestic family law. The book thus provides an excellent introduction to the area of children's rights in international law by
discussing the problems that a nation such as the United States
has in recognizing certain kinds of rights and that drafters of international conventions have in formulating statements of rights.
If this book has a message for students of international law, it
* Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A. 1971,
LL.B. 1972, Cambridge; LL.M. 1977, University of Virginia.
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is the problem of the process of creating common understanding
and commitment in international relations. All the articles in the
book testify to the conflict between national interest and international order, mediated as it is by the practical concern of politics.
In the first article,' by Willis L.M. Reese, the author concludes
that "adherence to the Convention may not be worth the
trouble,"'2 because it will be inapplicable in most situations and
because it will be troublesome when it does apply. For example,
when the validity of a marriage is not incidental to another issue,
such as succession, the United States would be required to recognize a marriage valid under the law of the state of celebration
even if that marriage were incestuous under United States law
and between domiciliaries who had gone abroad expressly to
avoid United States law.3 Therefore, the Convention should be
adhered to, even for international appearances, only when the
price of compromising the national interest in the sanctity of the
domestic rules of marriage is not too great to pay. But there is
more here than a conflict between two states with different conceptions of an incestuous marriage. An international agreement
has value even if its application creates occasional conflicts of
principle in the domestic forum. This seems illogical only if we
think of national law as a system of rules organized by the sovereign authority of the state in a closed and logical way and if that
model is applied to international law. On the other hand, if law is
thought of as an open ended process in which shared values are
articulated as legal rules that come into play when values conflict,
then recognizing another nation's rules and rites of marriage
through an international agreement promotes the tolerance and
diversity which underlies all general principles of law, including
reciprocal recognition of national sovereignty.
In the gradual process of the creation of international law, each
nation must accomodate others, so that the product will represent
its own values and principles. This is especially true when what is
given up (such as certain requirements for the validity of mar1. Reese, The Hague Convention on Celebrationand Recognition of the Validity of Marriages, in THE FAMILY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME EMERGING
PROBLEMS 1 (R. Lillich ed. 1981).

2. Id. at 17.
3.

THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CELEBRATION AND RECOGNITION OF THE VALID-

ITY OF MARRIAGES,

I.L.M. 18 (1977).

arts. 9, 11, opened for signature Oct. 1, 1977, reprintedin 16
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riages) does not threaten national sovereignty. The act of agreement reinforces the respect for differences that constitutes the
basis of United States society and is the goal of international society. Where that respect is compromised by the subordination of
one nation's rule to another nation's rule, then public policy can
provide a way out,4 so that if the incestuous marriage is incompatible with public policy it need not be recognized. This public
policy exception shifts the actual differences back into the national forum, but the Convention at least provides a means for
development of a jurisprudence of international marriage law
from the principles and values upon which agreement is reached.
This is surely worth the trouble. Further, because the Convention
has been open for signature since 1977, we may assume it represents agreement, and that the development of international law is
complete except for matters of form. This is very different from
other areas of international politics where, for example, the actual
nature of the family as a social institution is being examined. The
contrast between this first article and the other three is between
discussions of the expediency of ratification and the principled
debate about fundamental values. Agreement is sometimes best
expressed in general statements leaving room for independence
and sometimes the issues seem so important that a binding agreement is called for, even though the need may be greatest in those
areas with the most exaggerated differences. Agreement on children's rights, unlike agreement on requirements for a valid marriage, if it is to be realistic and more than a catalogue of welfare
needs, must challenge a nation's determination of its family
structure.
Richard E. Crouch, in his article entitled, InternationalDeclaration/Convention Efforts and the Current Status of Children's
Rights in the United States, 5 warns against expedient adherence
to the Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child because it is
too vague and because its language conflicts with certain provisions of the United States Constitution. 7 Harvey Schweitzer takes

4. Id. art. 14.

5.

Crouch, International Declaration/ConventionEfforts and the Current

Status of Children's Rights in the United States, in THE FAMILY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: Soim EMERGING PROBLEMS 19 (R. Lillich ed. 1981).

6. Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, E.S.C. Res. 20, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 4) at 123, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1292 (1978).
7.

Crouch, supra note 5, at 78, 81, 83.
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a more critical approach in his article entitled, A Children's
Rights Convention-What is the United Nations Accomplishing?8 Schweitzer believes that the Convention may fragment the
law of children's rights because of its failure to specify the effects
of other existing international obligations upon children's rights.
Both of these articles emphasize the difficulty of reaching international agreement when basic values remain in dispute or are
unclear at a national level. The issue of children's rights is interesting because it involves not only the synthesis of national laws
into an international agreement, but the development of new law.
The point remains, however, that the creation of international
law depends on the harmonization of individual systems of law
either with an international system, so certain national interests
are accomodated into overriding values, or with each other, so
that equal respect is affirmed but accomodated by public policy.
Mutuality, however, can arise only when the overriding values are
so clear that their principled expression can be taken as a starting
point. The fundamental problem in the area of children's rights is
not so much differences of opinion about parental control, for example, but about the limits of the law. The privacy of the family
confronts the very value of the law and the state. For, as Crouch
notes, if children's rights are upheld in any redistribution of parental rights, then the state and its social agencies' role must expand at the expense of the privacy of the family." The law as an
agent of state control is limited in its usefulness. We may ask
with Crouch whether the law can deal with an unloved child.' 0
The implicit danger is that the family may be undermined by
the state's enforcement of children's rights to the extent of state
relocations of children, state supervision of childrearing, and
other totalitarian nightmares. If the conflicting interests of parental control and children's welfare are resolved by the criterion of
the best interest of the child, then this danger is avoided by the
presumption in favor of parental determination absent special
conditions of neglect or mistreatment. The abuses of parental
control, however, are what give rise to charters of children's
rights. When put in this way, the conflict appears to be between
8. Schweitzer, A Children's Rights Convention-What is the United Nations Accomplishing?, in THE FAMILY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SoME EMERGING
PROBLEMS 115 (R. Lillich ed. 1981).
9. Crouch, supra note 5, at 31.
10. Id. at 61.
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parental proprietary interests in children and the autonomy of
the individual child. The issue is not this simple. Others have
proprietary interests, as Thomas E. Carbonneau points out in his
article entitled, Operation Babylift-The Dilemma Surrounding
1 1 United States courts
Child Custody Controversies.
have reaffirmed the presumption in favor of the natural parent and have
not considered the possibility that it may be in the best interests
of the child to stay with the de facto psychological parent in the
cases of children airlifted out of Vietnam in 1975. The great potential for abuse by the adoption industry if a presumption were
given to the adopting parents over the natural parents is one reason for the strength of the contrary presumption. 12 The current
meaning of the best interests of the child may be determined by
accomodating competing interests of adults, but any judgment
about the child's best interest that does more than take the child
away from unsuitable parents and place the child with someone
who can provide better care threatens to eliminate cultural diversity and alternative conceptions of socialization under the guise of
protecting children's rights.
The concept of "rights" is more in question than the proper
concepts of children's welfare, security, and needs. 13 The assumption that children do not have interests independent of the parents and that they are incapable of participating in decisions that
affect them necessarily are confronted. 4 Placing parents' rights
opposite children's rights forces a determination of the limits of
the role of the law in family affairs. The premise of using the law
to adjust the individual and social balance between parental control and the best interest of the child represents an erosion of the
family; this is an erosion of one of the few effective barriers to the
legislation of the whole of human existence. The fundamental interest underlying the value of the family is parental control. Only
within the matrix of family privacy can the concept of children's
rights make sense. Therefore, the general principle of law, in the
sense referred to in article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the Interna-

11. Carbonneau, Operation Babylift-The Dilemma Surrounding Child
Custody Controversies, in THE

FAMI.Y IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME EMERGING

PROBLEMS 87 (R. Lillich ed. 1981).
12. Id. at 26, 112.

13. Id. at 30.
14. Id. at 117.
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tional Court of Justice, 15 is that the child's best interest is served

by respecting the decisions and choices of the natural parents absent special circumstances such as abuse or neglect. Given the
great differences of opinion about the relative importance of parental control, children's best interests and family privacy, and
given the unsatisfactory nature of the Draft Convention in light
of these competing interests, the Convention represents a great
achievement in international cooperation and agreement. The
problems the contributors illuminate have less to do with national
differences of opinion about particular rights, because, as with the
Convention on Celebration and Recognition of Marriages, such
differences can be accomodated by public policy exceptions.
Rather, they have to do with the significance of an international
right. It seems more conceptually accurate and practically feasible
to realize that through this Convention, international law is seeking to express ideals of respect for all persons rather than minimum conditions of behavior and that the language of rights can
give effect to only determinate conceptions of equality and liberty. To create rights for children without clear conceptions of the
liberty of the family and its members and their respective equality will restrict the Convention to a pious entreaty.
The rights of children are neither absolute nor independent. To
enshrine children's interests in the form of rights crystallizes the
uneasy relationship between law and society. The most interesting aspect of this topic is that the compromises and accomodations of national law are brought into sharp focus by the demands
of reaching international agreement. Children's rights are, fundamentally, duties that limit state interference with equality and
liberty as much as parental control. Thus, the Convention would
require its signatories to grant to the international legal system a
part of their determination of the practical meaning of equality
and liberty. The difficulty is this: although it makes sense to talk
of international politics, there is no international society. Consequently the challenge facing a Convention on the Rights of the
Child is to develop a definition of international law that balances
the individual rights of parents and children with the international political duties of the state and relates the values of family
life to international society. Meeting this challenge would take international law a long way toward transcending the polarity be15. 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187.
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tween citizen and state that is the impasse faced by the jurisprudence of common law countries today. The key concept is the
family. The idea of law as a medium through which we express
ourselves rather than as a system of constraints, imperatives, or
norms offers a perspective for a new jurisprudence. How families
are treated in law reveals how society treats itself, through its
self-representation in politics and its self-reflection in ethics. The
progress made by the international legal system gives hope for the
respect for differences among states and the recognition that differences exist against a background of common interest in liberty
and equality. The implications of this book, therefore, are very
profound for the merging problems of the family in international
law and are evidence of the deeper significance of the progress of
international law today. Not enough attention is paid to such developments in international law. The University of Virginia is to
be commended for its ambitious undertaking to combine national
and international viewpoints in what often is considered a relatively unimportant area: family law.

TREATIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,

1949-1978: AN AN-

By Grant F. Rhode and Reid E. Whitlock.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. ix, 207. $25.00. Reviewed by David A. Elder*
NOTATED COMPILATION.

The "joint communiqu" of January 1, 1979, between the People's Republic of China and the United States, granting reciprocal
recognition and establishing diplomatic relations between the two
countries, was an epochal event in modern international relations.
It accorded full international stature to the People's Republic of
China for the first time and nurtured a resurgence of interest in
contacts with it at governmental, commercial, academic, and
many other levels.1 As the authors note, however, prior to the
publication of their book, parties interested in interaction with
the People's Republic of China had no readily available English
language compilation of Chinese treaties with which to evaluate
its treaty-making posture and practice. The authors' expressed
"primary aim" is to rectify this deficiency in source materials by
providing an accurate translation and complete listing of Chinese
treaties (t'iao yiieh). But the limited scope of the undertaking,
with its acknowledged "conscious neglect" 3 of any attempt to analyze authoritatively the texts themselves, is likewise the most
noteworthy deficiency, and produces occasionally superficial introductory essays and a cumbersome listing of duplicative treaty
texts. As a result of the relative dearth of available materials on
Chinese treaty practice, the compilation nevertheless serves a useful function and portends the advent of more definitive interpretations of the subject matter.
With this caveat regarding the coverage of this altogether too
brief volume in mind, it perhaps will be beneficial to the potential
reader to sketch in skeletal fashion the general contours of the
book. The pre-eminent focus of the compilation is on t'iao yileh
(treaties), the hierarchically most important and formal interna* Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University, A.B. 1969, Bellamine College; J.D. 1972, St. Louis University; LL.M.

1973, Columbia University.
1. G. RHODE & R. WHITLOCK, TREATIES OF THE PEOPLE'S
1949-1978: AN ANNOTATED COMPILATION 202 (1980).
2. Id. at 207.
3. Id.

REPUBLIc OF CHINA,

278

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16.277

tional accord, and the use made of t'iao yaeh by the People's Republic of China in pursuit of its perceived foreign policy interests.
Unfortunately, however, after listing uncritically and noncomparatively the other less important forms of international accords," the authors discuss the nature of t'iao yiieh in only the
most summary fashion. After noting the "somewhat difficult"5
task of differentiating the t'iao yiieh from its lesser counterparts
and referring to broad and similarly unhelpful criteria suggested
by other commentators,' the authors tersely conclude that the denomination t'iao yiieh is "reserved primarily for application to
documents of maximum importance, requiring maximum force
and maximum binding."' 7 The authors' failure to define this term
leaves the reader wondering while he peruses the chapters dealing
with specific categories of treaties.
The first chapter, "Friendship Treaties," includes the full texts
of all eighteen extant treaties, the signatories of which are fellow
socialist and Third World countries.8 These vaguely worded treaties typically grant reciprocal acknowledgement of and respect for
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; stipulate the
maintenance and development of peaceful relations; expressly
provide for settlement of disputes between the contracting parties
by pacific negotiations; and specify that the parties agree to
strengthen their economic, cultural, and scientific ties. By far the
most interesting of the friendship treaties is the earliest one, the
1950 accord with the Soviet Union. Imbued with an almost paranoid fear of a rejuvenated, militaristic Japan, the signatories "undertake not to conclude any alliance directed against the other
High Contracting Party, and not to take part in any coalition or
in actions or measures directed against the other High Contracting Party."" Although this treaty is "ignored in practice,"'I0 it
is still officially in effect despite the option to terminate it unilat4. Id. at 3.
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 6.
8. The countries include the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Guinea, Cambodia, Indonesia,
North Korea, Ghana, the Republic of Yemen, the Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, and
Tanzania. Id. at 12-14.
9. This is provided for in article 3 of the treaty. G. RHODE & R. WHITLocK,
supra note 1, at 16.
10. Id. at 10.
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erally on February 14, 1980, by giving notice one year prior to its
expiration.1 1 Consequently, the automatic five year extension proviso became operative, which reflects the political judgment that,
despite the aura of vitriol enveloping their relations, a total lapse
of the treaty was inadvisable.
Chapter two, "Boundary Treaties," includes the full texts, replete with detailed and, occasionally, vividly descriptive 12 boundary designations, of the four negotiated boundary treaties 13 (t'iao
yiieh) and the one agreement (hsieh-ting). The latter, concluded
by Pakistan and the People's Republic of China, is of particular
interest and evidences the negotiating prowess of the People's Republic of China. Relegated to the status of an agreement (hsiehting) because of the Pakistan-India dispute over the Kashmir
area, which was stated to be under the "actual control" of Pakistan, 4 the accord nonetheless provides for the continued viability
of the provisions in the event of eventual Pakistani success in settling its dispute with India: "[I]n the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of the present Agreement
and of the aforesaid Protocol shall be maintained in the formal
Boundary Treaty to be signed between the People's Republic of
China and Pakistan."1 5
The authors conclude that there are three categories of cases in
which the People's Republic of China has not concluded boundary treaties. First, in the case of the former colonial preserves of
Hong Kong and Macau, the People's Republic of China "perceives it as not in her own best interest" to negotiate treaties to
replace the existing "unequal treaties," preferring to leave those
entities in a "nebulous state of definition" which it can "exploit"
as it "sees fit and possible."1 6 Predicting that it is doubtful such
treaties ever will be negotiated, the authors note the indefinite
future of Hong Kong when the ninety-nine year lease included in
the 1898 Convention expires in 1997.17 Second, the authors suggest that Korea and Vietnam may be the next likely candidates

11. Id. at 16.
12. See id. at 56-97.
13. The treaties were negotiated with Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan. Id. at 54-55. For useful maps displaying relevant geography,
see id. at 98-110 (included as addenda).
14. Id. at 52.
15. This quotation is contained in article 6 of the treaty. Id. at 97.
16. Id. at 52.
17. Id. at 49.
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for formal boundary treaties, replacing the antiquated treaties
with former imperial powers.1 8 The third category, which the authors correctly predict to be the most difficult to resolve, includes
China's northern and southern neighbors, the Soviet Union, and
India. Of the two, the Soviet-Chinese border dispute is undoubtedly the more intractable because of the following factors: the
length of the border; the inaccessibility of the terrain through
which the border passes; the issue of the ethnic minorities in the
area; the vagueness of existing treaties; the Soviet Union's adherence to and the Chinese dissatisfacton with the Czarist Imperial
Dynasties' boundary treaties, which the Chinese consider "unequal"; and the present reciprocally polemic relationship between
the two nations. 19
Chapter three, "Treaties of Commerce and Navigation," includes the text of six treaties, four of which are with countries
bordering the People's Republic of China.20 Of the remaining two,
the Sino-Yemeni treaty is undoubtedly the most interesting and
is sui generis in Chinese treaty practice because of its explicit recognition of and unusual sensitivity to the economic, religious, cultural, and political realities of the Islamic state. On economic
matters, this treaty provides that "[e]ach contracting party shall
endeavor to reach a balance between the value of its exports to
and the value of its imports from the other party." 21 According to
the authors, this provision apparently is intended to avoid impairment of the delicate Yemeni economy.22 Additionally, the
contracting parties proscribed trade in "such commodities . . .
prohibited for sale and purchase by the laws and decrees in force
by the religious rules of either contracting party," provided for
strict observance by natural and corporate persons of "the local
laws and regulations in force," mandated respect for the "religious and social customs and habits in the territory of the other
party," and pledged nonintervention in the "internal affairs" of
the country of residence by its nationals.23
Chapter four, "Consular Treaties," includes the texts of the
18. Id. at 53.
19. Id.
20. The countries are the Soviet Union, Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam. The remaining noncontiguous countries are Yemen and Albania. Id. at
119-47.
21. Id. at 121 (quoting article 9 of the treaty).
22. Id. at 113.

23. Id. at 120 (quoting articles 5 & 7 of the treaty).
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three similar treaties entered into during an eighteen month period in 1959 and 1960.24 The authors frankly acknowledge that
they are "at a loss"'25 to explain the rationale for the selection of
the three countries 26 and the use of t'iao yiieh instead of the more
common informal arrangements. Paralleling their treatment of
similarly interesting issues elsewhere, the authors blithely conclude that they will "leave the solution to this problem for
27
others."
The authors' frustrating policy of listing lengthy treaty texts
with only the most perfunctory introductory essays continues in
chapter five, "Treaty of Dual Nationality," in which the interesting Sino-Indonesian t'iao yifeh is preceded by a singularly un-illuminating and terse two paragraph statement. In this statement
the authors merely tantalize the reader by referring to correspondence prior to and subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty
which "sheds tremendous light"2' 8 on the concerns of the contracting parties. There is no attempt to give the reader any insight into why Indonesia summarily and unilaterally terminated
the treaty in 1969 despite a specific provision precluding such an
action.2 9
The last two chapters are undoubtedly the most interesting sections of the compilation, though they deviate significantly from
the prior focus on t'iao yfleh. Chapter Six, "China and Japan,"
includes the text of the 1972 "Joint Statement" between the People's Republic of China and Japan, in which the latter made a
remarkable public obeisance, stating, on bended knee, that it was
"keenly aware" of its "responsibility for causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war," and that
Japan "deeply reproaches itself" for such militaristic malfeasance.3" In terminating the preexisting "abnormal state of affairs," Japan accorded recognition to the People's Republic of
China as "the sole legal government of China," and stated that it
"fully understands and respects" the Chinese position that Taiwan constitutes "an inalienable part of the territory of the Peo24.
25.
26.
Id. at
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 151-68.
Id. at 148.
The countries are the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.
151-68.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 169.
Id.
Id. at 178.
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ple's Republic of China." 31 Japan did not, however, abnegate its
prior purely hortatory stand that Taiwan should be, not is, part
of the People's Republic of China.3 2 China reciprocated by repudiating its prior demand for war indemnities from Japan. 3 After
reestablishing diplomatic relations, providing for expeditious exchange of ambassadors, referring to the broad boilerplate principles of peaceful coexistence, promising respect for sovereignty
and nonintervention in internal affairs and agreeing to settle disputes "by peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of
force," the two governments declared that neither "should seek
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed
to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish
such hegemony." 34 The final undertaking of the 1972 "Joint
Statement," aimed at "conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship, 35 culminated in the 1978 "Treaty of Peace and Friendship," which affirmed that the precursor document "should be
strictly observed."3 6 Its most significant provision, the reiteration
of the antihegemony stance contained in the 1972 "Joint Statement," is noteworthy for its extension of the precatory disavowal
37
to "any other region.1
Chapter seven, "China and the United States," includes a haphazardly written and poorly organized prefatory essay and a collection of the joint communiques and statements that constitute
the legal milieu within which Sino-United States relations have
been "normalized." The "Shanghai Communiqu6," issued at the
end of President Nixon's historic trip to China, is by far the most
interesting item in the collection. Setting forth its broad geopolitical concerns, including its interest in extricating itself from the
quagmire in Vietnam, the United States emphasized its belief
that "the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to

31. Id. at 178-79.
32. In the "Joint Statement" Japan refers to its adherence to the "Potsdam
Proclamation," which, in the words of the authors, had "endorsed the Cairo
statement," to the effect that Taiwan "ought" to be part of China. Id. at 177.
Unfortunately, the authors provide no citation for the "Cairo statement," paral-

leling
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

their looseness, in this respect, throughout the compilation.
Id. at 179.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 184 (quoting article 2 of the treaty).
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lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation
or misunderstanding."' 8 In this vein, it "stressed that the peoples
of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention" and stated that its "constant primary
objective had been a negotiated solution. 3 9 Similarly, the Chinese "candidly" asserted their view that liberation and revolution
are "the irresistible trend of history," that all nations are "equal"
and that "big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak.

' 40

Furthermore, China stated

that it eschewed status as a superpower and "opposes hegemony
and power politics of any kind"; that "the people of all countries
have the right to choose their social systems according to their
own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose
foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion"; that
"[a]ll foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries";
that it firmly supports the right of the peoples of Southeast Asia
and Korea to self-determination. 1 Agreeing that the countries
have "essential differences.

. .

in their social systems and foreign

policies," 42 the two countries promised to apply the principles of
"peaceful coexistence" in their "mutual relations" and concluded
that "normalization" of Sino-United States relations was in their
mutual interest and in the interest of world peace; that both
"wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict";
that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region";
that both opposed "efforts by any other country or group [of]
countries to establish such hegemony"; that it is against the interests of all nations for "any major country to collude with another
against other
countries" or to "divide the world into spheres of
43
interest.'

China reaffirmed its traditional position that Taiwan is the
'crucial question" impeding normal relations with the United
States, stated that the People's Republic of China is the sole legal
government of China, claimed that "liberation of Taiwan" is exclusively a Chinese matter, and asserted that all United States
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 197.
at 198.
at 198-99.
at 199.
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forces "must be withdrawn from Taiwan."4 4 It declared further

that it "firmly opposes" any semblance of a "two China" policy or
any position espousing the view that the "status of Taiwan remains to be determined.

'45

The United States, in response, de-

clared that it does not challenge the position of both mainland
China and Taiwan that there is only "one China" and Taiwan is
an integral part of it. The United States "reaffirms its interest in
a peaceful settlement" of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese peoples, endorsed the "ultimate objective" of withdrawal of all
United States forces and installations from Taiwan, and undertook to "progressively reduce" the United States presence "as the
'4
tension in the area diminishes.

The final three documents regarding Sino-United States
"normalizaton," listed for some reason in reverse chronological
order, are the United States "Statement" of December 15, 1978,
the Chinese "Statement" of the following day, and the "Joint
Communique" of January 1, 1979. The latter accorded reciprocal
recognition and established diplomatic relations from that date
forward. The United States formally recognized the Government
of the People's republic of China as the "sole legal Government of
China." The Communiqu6 provided, however, that "[w]ithin this
context the people of the United States will maintain cultural,
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.'

47

It is noteworthy that the United States "Statement" ter-

minating diplomatic relations with and obligations to Taiwan and
declaring that it "will be withdrawing" the remaining military
personnel within four months"8 was made without any formal,
written assurance from the People's Republic of China that the
Taiwan controversy would be settled without the use of force.
The United States merely noted that it was "confident that the
people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future" and
stated that it continued "to have an interest" in its peaceful resolution and expects the conflict to "be settled peacefully by the
Chinese themselves."49 The Chinese "Statement" of the following

day, December 16, 1978, clearly and unequivocally concluded that
44. Id. at 199-200.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 200.
47. Id. at 202 (emphasis added).

48. Id. at 204.
49. Id.
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"[a]s for -the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the
motherland and reunifying the.country, it is entirely China's internal affair.

' 50

The latter, viewed in conjunction with the "sole

legal Government of China" language of the "Joint Communiqu6," evidences that, whatever verbal assurances may have been
given regarding "peaceful resolution" of the thorny Taiwan issue,
the People's Republic of China left itself substantial flexibility
under the public statements and communiqu6s contained in this
compilation.
As this synthesis of the topics in the sourcebook amply demonstrates, the authors have provided the reader with a wealth of potentially useful information. It is unfortunate, however, that the
authors rarely discuss the treaties and other international agreements in sufficient depth. They regularly nullify the utility of
texts included by providing brief or superficial background information. Three other features of the book likewise warrant critical
note. First, magnifying the self-proclaimed absence of intent to
interpret the texts authoritatively, the authors provide precious
little in the way of collateral sources or suggested additional reading to enable the reader to analyze the texts intelligently. Also,
even where the authors do provide reasonably helpful factual information, they rarely cite to source authority. The net result is a
frustrating lack of direction for one interested in pursuing the
topic in greater depth. Second, in terms of style, the authors'
translations often are awkward, though perhaps this is attributable to the phraseology of the original language. Third, there are
numerous spelling errors and sentence fragments in the commentaries to and texts of the treaties themselves; the authors' writing
style often borders on being counterproductive.
The reviewer's conclusion is that the book may provide a useful
research tool to China scholars and may be of significant utility to
readers with sufficient expertise generally in Chinese affairs. Nevertheless, this book has noteworthy substantive deficiencies that
make it of only marginal usefulness to the relatively untutored
reader who desires additional information or who hopes to develop expertise in the area of Chinese treaty-making practice.

50.

Id. at 203.

AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. By Charles Lewis. London:
Lloyd's Press of London, Ltd., 1980. Pp. xv, 135. 16f. Reviewed by
Edward A. Laing*
STATE

State or sovereign immunity law is a fascinating field in which
to study the classification techniques of the legal profession
worldwide, the apparently widely differing legal methodologies of
the civil and common law "worlds," and the national attitudes
about the relationship between the international and national legal systems and their bodies of law.
Quot homines, tot sententiae:suo quoque mos, said the Roman
writer Terence. This, in the translation of Lord Denning, the English Master of the Rolls,' means "so many men, so many opinions: his own a law to each."' 2 The statement probably epitomizes
the phenomenon of judgments which serve the cause which one
represents. It probably also highlights the interminable nightmare
for honest lawyers: the difficulty of fitting facts into preordained
molds or of extrapolating from apparently diverse facts the appropriate descriptive or prescriptive systems of classification.
This problem is illustrated Vividly and sometimes amusingly by
decisions about state immunity. Most jurisdictions in the world
today fit state immunity questions into a somewhat crude classification matrix comprised of two elements. The restrictive theory
of state immunity is based on the Latin dichotomy of acta imperii and acta gestionis, which are translated roughly as acts or
transactions in the exercise of sovereign authority3 and acts or
transactions not in the exercise of sovereign authority and essentially identical or similar to acts of an ordinary citizen. It is
thought by some 4 that juridical acts or transactions can be fitted
under one or the other of these two labels. Consequently, state
immunity will be accorded to acts labelled acta imperii but
not to
acts labelled acta gestionis. Judges, however, have had notorious
* Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Program, Howard University
School of Law. B.A. 1964, LL.B. 1966, M.A. 1967, Cambridge; LL.M. 1968,
Columbia.
1. As such, he presides over the Court of Appeal.
2.

C. LEWIS, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 87 (1980) (quoting The I Con-

greso del Partido, [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 23, 30).
3.

Id. at 7.

4. Id. at 80.
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problems applying the labels, often coming to different conclusions about the same facts. Lewis illustrates the problem by stating that in France, a contract to supply cigarettes to the
Vietnamese army and, in the United States, a contract for the
purchase of army boots, have been held to be sovereign acts, but,
in Italy, a contract for the purchase of army boots has been held
to be actum gestionis.5
These judgmental problems stem from the excessive breadth of
the classification dichotomy. Efforts to refine these abstract Latinized labels, however, have not been overwhelmingly successful.
This is evidenced by the somewhat half-baked, but quite popular,
attempt by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit to tabulate what "jure imperii" includes.' One might ask,
for instance, whether the purchase of cigarettes for the armed
forces or whether, in a civil law country, the administrative act of
riot control, during which plaintiff is injured due to a malicious
act, are exclusively or dominantly sovereign acts. There is a similar degree of imprecision in the legislative formulation introduced
by the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,7
which departs from the ground-breaking Tate letter of 19528 in
one important respect. In the Tate letter, the Department of
State announced its adherence to the restrictive theory of state
immunity as a new executive policy of the United States and its
adoption of the dichotomy of sovereign and non-sovereign private
acts. The Tate letter's formulation of the dichotomy had long
been articulated in civil law countries, where it originated, because the civil law system categorizes all legal acts and transactions either as private or as public, which is the equivalent of sovereign. The 1976 Act follows cases 9 purporting to implement the

5. Id.
6. Victory Transport v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). The court listed:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity, and

(5) public loans
Id.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
8. The Tate letter was written by the Acting Legal Adviser to the Department of State, Jack B. Tate. See 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
9. E.g., Victory Transport, 336 F.2d 354.
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Tate letter's policy, but it articulates a dichotomy of public acts
and commercial acts. Because conceptually and in practice, commercial law and activity are a relatively small subspecies of the
generic class of private law and activity, it might be concluded
that, at least at the level of theory, the formulation of the 1976
Act and the cases on which it is based is not entirely successful.
The classification problem in part highlights facially significant
differences between the approach to legal reasoning used in civil
and common law systems. The common law's empirical inductive
approach has contributed to a piecemeal approach to the classification of legal phenomena. The legal system pressures decisionmakers to force juridical facts into myriad watertight rules,
which are the crystallization of allegedly distinguishable fact patterns. When that is unsuccessful, the system invents new watertight rules of black letter law. 10 The inherent instability of such a
method is shored up by the doctrine of binding precedent, which
is a testimonial to the belief that in empiricism there is certainty.
A rigid precedential system, however, easily can be the handmaiden of inflexible and irrelevant norms. This is what happened
in England after 1880, when the Court of Appeal, in The Parlement Belge, 1 misread previous authority, which was reasonably
consistent with the restrictive theory of state immunity, and
adopted the absolute theory.1 " This theory got entrenched by the
strict, inductive doctrine of stare decisis. Until the 1978 English
Act, the strongest attack on the absolute theory by a purely English court1 3 was pressed in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria,4 where one of the grounds for deciding that the
defendant bank was not immune from suit was the acta gestionis
formulation of the restrictive theory. Unfortunately, because the
case apparently was settled, the House of Lords never got the op-

10. This is probably what the judge was trying to do in Victory Transport.
11. 5 P.D. 197 (1880).
12. See C. LEwis, supra note 2, at 10-15.
13. The ground-breaking case of The Philippine Admiral (Owners) v. Whallen Shipping (Hong Kong), Ltd., 1977 A.C. 373 (P.C.) (holding that the absolute
theory of state immunity excluded actions in rem regarding state-owned ships)
is not an exception. That case was decided by the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, largely composed of judges of the House of Lords, the highest
English Court, but sitting as a purely Commonwealth Court in a case from Hong
Kong.
14. [1977] 1 All E.R. 881.
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portunity to rule definitively on the Trendtex decision. 15
By way of comparison, one probable reason why most civil law
countries firmly adopted the restrictive theory long before the
common law countries did is their open approach to legal reasoning, which actively operates with relatively broad norms, compared with the tight jurisprudential and statutory formulations
popular in common law countries, and relies on progressive and
evolutionary interpretative methodologies.1 6 These flexible methodologies have not been found in common law jurisdictions, where
judges at times pursue a "sturdy independence, not to say insularity," as Lewis says1" when discussing an English judge's refusal
to adopt "the Continental approach to statutory construction."' s
It would be interesting to discover the extent to which the persistence of dualism"9 in the foreign relations law of the United
Kingdom 20 helped to entrench the absolute theory. It might be
that subconscious perceptions that the universal popularity of the
restrictive theory and its probable validity as a normative reality
of universal international law might have set the English judiciary
against altering the precedent-based absolute theory of state immunity. Always an iconoclast, however, Lord Denning in the
Trendtex case 21 undertook to turn his back on the obvious de
facto dualism of the approach of the English courts to the question of the relations between the international legal system and
the English legal system. Following dicta saying that "the Law of
Nations in its full extent [is] part of the law of England, ' 22 he
concluded that the domestic law of other countries and other evidence of international law demonstrates that the theory was man-

C. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 22.
For a recent discussion, see Laing, InternationalEconomic Law & Public
Order in the Age of Equality, 12 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 727, 745-48 (1980).
17. C. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 80-81.
18. Id. Lord Wilberforce was the presiding judge in James Buchanan & Co.
v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping Co. 1978 A.C. 141 (P.C.).
19. For a discussion of the theory that international law and the international legal system are not, per se, part of the national corpus juris and legal
system or, that the national corpus juris and legal system are subsets of international law and the international legal system, see 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-61 (2d ed. 1970).
15.
16.

20. And, for that matter, of the United States.
21.

[1977] 1 All E.R. 881.

22. See, e.g., Triquet v. Bath, [1764] 3 Burr. 1478, 1481 (citation omitted).
Lord Denning's view was shared by one of the other two judges deciding the
case, namely Shaw, L.J. See Trendtex, [1977] 1 All E.R. at 908-09.
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dated by universal customary international law, which, by virtue
of the doctrine of incorporation (an aspect of monism), was a part
of the English body of law.
Although Lewis' book contains materials which are relevant to
the matters discussed so far in this review, he does not engage in
detailed discussion of them- Instead, his task is to summarize the
1978 statute and the common law on state immunity together
with two statutes on diplomatic privileges and consular immunities23 in a manner which apparently is intended for the practicing
English bar. 24 This somewhat limits the appeal of the book to foreign readers and is regrettable because foreign states and their
non-English legal advisers presumably are the primary consumers
of a work on state immunity. Nevertheless, the book provides
some important insights into the statutes and the common law
which are useful because: (1) the common law still governs pre1978 acts; (2) transactions will be used as a backdrop for interpreting the 1978 Act; and (3) the common law remains the living
law in many members of the Commonwealth that follow the English common law and have not yet enacted new state immunity
statutes. This book's utility is heightened by its brief discussion
of a number of important facts. Some form of an English restrictive theory probably preceded the adoption of the absolute theory25 late in the nineteenth century. 26 There are several exceptions to the absolute theory, the most important of which
probably is state non-immunity with respect to real property,
trust funds, and debts for services to state property situated in
England.27 Finally, the new Act, which adopts a basic rule of immunity subject to stated exceptions, now imposes the burden of
disproving immunity on the plaintiff.28 For those who did not already know it, the approach of the 1978 Act follows the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity on which it is based and
states some exceptions to immunity which are not clearly articulated in the 1976 United States Act. These exceptions apply to
23. See infra note 42.
24. This is evidenced by his discussion of the procedural aspects of the 1978
Act in chapter 9 and his mention of the so-called "Mareva" orders on page 23.
He refers to English Supreme Court rules and procedures without proffering an
explanation for non-English readers.
25. C. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 13.
26. Id. at 15.
27. Id. at 16-24, 34.
28. Id. at 25.
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contracts of employment,2 9 state membership of private corporations incorporated in or with their principal places of business in
the United Kingdom, 30 and matters related to industrial or intellectual intangible property registered or protected in the United
31
Kingdom.
Lewis' discussion of doctrine is very limited, and in fact, rather
lame for one who was a "quondam Open Scholar at Oriel College,
Oxford." Therefore, rather than being synthesized or analyzed,
cases are summarized in fine print replete with quotations. One
must concede that there is some utility in this because the nonEnglish reader, for whom the book apparently was not intended,
gets access to some of the decided cases. For example, Lewis summarizes the I Congreso del Partido case,32 which discusses the
question of whether the defendant Cuban state corporation, when
sued for breach of contract in connection with what was clearly
acta gestionis, could claim the defense of state immunity by asserting that the act which gave rise to the breach was an act of
sovereign authority pursuant to the high public policy of the Cuban Government in the realm of foreign relations.3 3 The majority
of the Court of Appeal accepted the defendant's contention.3 4
Lord Denning, however, correctly dissented, pointing out that the
majority's conclusion was tantamount to applying the universally
discarded methodology of assessing state immunity claims by analyzing the subjective purpose of the act rather than its inherent
and objective nature. 5
In addition to the problems with its presentation of materials,
especially cases and doctrine, there are quite a number of flaws in
Lewis' book. In several places it fails to cite or demonstrate that

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 39-42.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
See id. at 87.

33.

A Cuban state enterprise had breached its contract to deliver sugar to a

Chilean company, because of the Cuban Government's displeasure with the
right wing coup which displaced the Marxist Chilean Government of President
Salvador Allende. Cuba's displeasure also led it to sever diplomatic relations

with Chile.
34.

See id. at 83-86. One might, perhaps facetiously, query whether the

court's decision was influenced by the name of the ship, the translation of which
is "The First Congress of the [Communist, semble] Party."

35. Id. at 86-88.
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the writer consulted authority."

There are several errors3 7 and

some statements are vague or difficult to comprehend.", Finally,
there are awkward parenthetical phrases reminiscent of prolix legal drafting.3 9 On the other hand, this reviewer is unsure how to
react to statements like
The State Immunity Act ... brought the law of the United King-

dom into line with that of most other civilized countries. Judicial
activism had sought to bend the cripple-gaited common law back
upon itself so that it should reflect the views of yesteryear, but the
labour pains of the new doctrine were prolonged and disquieting to
witness. Nor had they yet produced a healthy child, whose survival
40
was assured (for an account of these travails see Chapter 3).
The theoretical basis of the rule of sovereign immunity can be
traced to a time when most States were ruled by personal sovereigns who, in a very real sense, personified the State ("L'Etat, c'est
moi"). In time the diplomat's immunity came to be based on a formal view of the rightful demands of a king or other head of State.
Even after the demise of the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings
and its last exponent, at least its last explicit one, on the block at
Whitehall some three hundred and thirty years ago, kings and gov36. For example, its assertion that the "doctrine of sovereign immunity
found its earliest manifestation in the protection afforded to diplomatic agents,"
id. at 11 is undocumented; later, Lewis poses the questionable proposition that §
5 of the 1978 Act (denying immunity in actions relating to certain torts taking
place in the United Kingdom is similar to a "provision in [a] United States statute [which] has been used to support an action by the wife of the former Chilean ambassador in respect of his alleged murder in Washington by agents of the
new Chilean Government," id. at 43. In fact the correct analogy is not with the
Long Arm statute probably relied on in the Letelier case, but with § 1605(5) of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (1976). A running summary of eight leading cases on the immunity of states with respect to their ships "is based on the
Privy Council's judgment in The Philippine Admiral. . ...
" id. at 52-56; and the

citation of several French cases. Id. at 93, 95.
37. An example is the assertion that in the case of The Philippine Admiral,
the Privy Council reaffirmed "the absolute rule" of immunity for actions in rem
when actually in personam is more appropriate. Id. at 20.
38. For example, after stating that the immunity of states grew out of personal immunity of sovereigns, see id. at 1, the assertion is made that "[iut
seemed a natural extension at the time, though now, with the enthusiastic participation of governments in the commercial arena, and the proliferation of
State-organized or State-controlled enterprises, the considerations that arise on
the immunity of States seem a far cry from those relevant to a sovereign's personal immunity." See also id. at 2, 23 (reference to "a Mareva injunction").
39. See id. at 1, 3.
40. Id. at 6-7.
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ernments have felt that the law should accord them special
treatment. 1
At least one must say that readers of Lewis' book will find more
than statutory summary and exegesis.4 2

41. Id. at 11-12.
42. This is essentially what the book does in its last three chapters, which
concern the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964 and the Consular Relations Act of
1968.

